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ABSTRACT 
This  study  joins  two  existing  logical  models  and  tests  the  resulting  predictions  of  mean 
cabinet duration (C). One of these models predicts C based on effective number of parties 
(N): C=k/N
2, where k is found to be around 42 years. The other predicts N on the basis of 
number of seats in the assembly (S) and district magnitude (M). The new combined model 
leads to a prediction for the mean cabinet duration in terms of these two institutional factors: 
C=42 years/(MS)
1/3. Three quarters of the actual mean durations agree with the prediction 
within a factor of 2. For the purposes of institutional engineering, the model predicts that 
doubling  the  district  magnitude  would  reduce  the  mean  cabinet  duration  by  21  percent 
ceteris paribus. 
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Introduction 
 
Why do most governmental cabinets tend to last long in some countries,  while in some 
others they tend to change almost every year? This study is the first, to our best knowledge, 
to  propose  an  explicit functional  connection  between  the  mean  duration  of  cabinets  and 
some institutional variables -- a link that enables us to make specific quantitative predictions 
and to test them so as to establish the range of error within which they hold. The part of the 
variation that remains unexplained leaves room for other explanatory factors. 
 
When new democracies decide on their institutions, typical duration of cabinets often is on 
the minds of decision-makers, among other concerns, foremost in the form of what they do 
not  want:  'Let  us  avoid  short-lived  cabinets  like  they  have  in…'  Excessively  short-lived 
cabinets are seen as ineffective, and more often than not, electoral systems get the blame -- 
namely  excessively  proportional  representation  (PR)  in  large  multi-seat  districts,  as 
contrasted with PR in smaller multi-seat districts or use of single-seat districts (SSD). So the 
typical  cabinet  duration  matters  to  the  practitioners  of  politics,  as  does  its  presumed 
connection to institutions such as electoral system.   
 
But what electoral system should we recommend to statesmen who consider 2-year cabinets 
too short? They may not like to have 15-year cabinets either, because these may not only go 
stale but also exclude many politicians for too long. We are not aware of any existing theory 
or model that could offer a specific recommendation, supported by theoretical considerations 
and empirical confirmation. Here we do offer such a model. 
 
Following the example of scholars such as Lijphart (1984, 1999), we deal with the arithmetic 
mean duration. If, over 30 years, the individual durations should vary appreciably, as it often 
does, say 8, 1, 2, 8, 1, 1, and 9 years, then the mean (4.3 years) may be felt to reflect what 
is of concern to political practitioners more than the median (2 years) or the geometric mean 
(2.7 years).   
 
Our  aim  is  to  establish  an  average  relationship  between  this  mean  duration  and  some 
institutional factors that legislators could alter, in principle. This means we do not have to 
take  a  stand  on  whether  excessively  short  or  long  durations  do  affect  government 
performance, a topic on which scholars disagree. A widespread view (e.g., Warwick 1994: 
139) is that short-lived cabinets are unlikely to provide effective policymaking and may over 
the longer run put regime survival in danger. Dogan (1989) disagrees, and Lijphart (1999: 
130) puts it bluntly: 'This view is as wrong as it is widespread.' Short-lived cabinets need not 
be inefficient, and overly durable cabinets may go stale. Lijphart (1999: 131-9) sees mean 
cabinet duration as a useful indicator of something else, namely executive dominance, and 
he proceeds to measure it in various ways. To the extent that we can explain why some 
countries tend to have shorter durations than others, we might also understand better what 
the mean cabinet durations signifies and implies. 
 
We do not address the 'micro' issue of why, within the same country with stable institutions, 
some cabinets last longer than others, taking a 'macro' view on the effect of electoral system 
on cabinet durability. A rich separate literature exists on this issue, focusing on bargaining 
models based on rational choice. Regarding the mean duration, however, the bargaining 
models have offered no specific quantitative predictions.
i  
 
We may conjecture that certain features affect the mean cabinet duration.  The number of 
parties visibly matters: Coalition cabinets, prevalent in multiparty systems, tend to be more 
short-lived than one-party majority cabinets. This was extensively documented by Lijphart 
(1984: 124-6), using the effective number of legislative p arties, N=1/si
2,  where si  is the 
fractional seat share of the i-th party. The number of parties, of course, cannot be altered by 
legislation, but it interacts with electoral systems. Single-seat districts (SSD) with plurality 4 
 
seat allocation rule tend to correspond to two-party systems according to the well-known 
Duverger's law, while proportional representation (PR) in multi-seat districts tends to go with 
multi-party  systems.
ii In  the  case  of  PR,  the  number  of  parties  is  affected  by  district 
magnitude (the  number  of seats  allocated  within a district,  M). The  larger  the  district 
magnitude, the more parties the system can accommodate. At the same mean magnitude, 
the number of districts in the given country also could matter, since more districts can offer 
niches to more parties. This means that the total assembly size (S) could affect the number 
of parties.
iii  
 
On this basis, we could go ahead and test a directional prediction: Mean cabinet duration (C) 
decreases as the number of parties ( N) increases, or more  briefly,  dC/dN<0. Also, the 
number of parties increases with increasing district magnitude (i.e.,  dN/dM>0) and with 
increasing total number of seats in the assembly (i.e.,  dN/dS>0). It follows that we expect 
mean cabinet duration to decrease as either district magnitude or assembly size increases: 
dC/dM<0 and dC/dS<0.  
 
Testing  such  directional  predictions  is  usual  in political  science.  However,  even  when 
successful, it would only enable us to tell the political practitioners that, in order to increase 
an existing mean duration, they would have to reduce district magnitude and/or assembly 
size. But by  how much  should they reduce them? Would it be a politically feasible or 
unthinkable  reduction?  Here  the  directional  model  reaches  its  limit.  We  need  the  full 
functional relationship C=f(M,S), not just the signs of its differentials ( dC/dM and dC/dS). It 
would be reckless to assume as a matter of faith that this decreasing function of  M and S is 
linear  (C=a-bM-cS),  because  most  basic  equations  in  mature  sciences  a re  not  linear 
(McGregor, 1993; Crease, 2004; Colomer, 2007). The format of the functional relationship 
must be established on logical grounds (Coleman, 2007). It often involves a numerical 
parameter to be determined empirically, and establishing such constants is an important part 
of testing the model (Sørensen, 1998; Hedström, 2004). 
 
Can we build on these qualitative considerations presented and establish a model  C=f(M,S) 
that would enable us to make specific predictions about the expected mean cabinet duration, 
with a specified range of likely error? Actually, pieces for such a model have been around. 
The present study links them, so as to establish a logical and testable chain extending from 
assembly size (S) and district magnitude ( M) to cabinet duration (C). The resulting purely 
institutionally based predictions will be tested. The intermediary stages involve the fractional 
seat share of the largest party ( s1) and the effective number of parliamentary parties (N). 
Predictions for cabinet duration at these intermediary stages will also be tested, so as to see 
where the random error range expands.  
   
What is random error from the viewpoint of a model in M and S includes the systematic 
effect  of  various  other  political  –  such  as  the  frequency  of  majority  governments  and 
presence/absence of investiture requirements – and cultural factors.  No logical quantitative 
model seems yet to be available for the impact of such other factors, important as they may 
be. This is why we focus on institutions. Once the institutional impact of M and S is factored 
out, the resulting residues may offer a clearer basis for studying the complementary impact 
of other factors. Indeed, we eagerly subscribe to Michael Laver’s contention that 
… clearly needed … is a well-grounded and coherent theoretical model generating 
observable implications that can be tested … in stark contrast to almost all reported 
empirical work on government termination, which has tended to assemble a portfolio 
of independent variables gleaned from previous work and the author’s own ideas, 
each given a brief ad hoc ‘theoretical’ justification in its own terms. (Laver, 2003: 30) 
 
 
 
 5 
 
The Institutional Model 
 
A logical connection between the mean cabinet duration and the effective number of parties 
is  outlined  in  Taagepera  and  Shugart  (1989:  99-101).  It  is  based  on  the  number  of 
communication  channels,  which  can  also  become  conflict  channels.  More  parties  mean 
more potential conflict channels that can undo a cabinet. (See Appendix for details.) The 
outcome is an inverse square law: C=k/N
2, where N is the effective number of legislative 
parties  and  k  is  a  constant  that  comes  in  units  of  time,  e.g.  years  or  months)  and  is 
determined empirically.
iv Using Lijphart's (1984) data, Taagepera and Shugart (1989) found 
that C=400 months/N
2=33 years/N
2 predicts mean cabinet duration for stable democracies 
within a factor of 2. It will be seen that our analysis of more extensive data (Lijphart, 1999) 
puts the best fit at C=42 years/N
2. What this model claims is that the actual duration has an 
equal probability of being above or below 42 years/N
2. It can be considered 'deterministic' 
only in this limited sense 
 
All this applies when cabinet duration is measured according to the criteria devised by Dodd 
(1976). Deciding when a cabinet is terminated is a difficult matter, discussed in length by 
Laver (2003). As measured by the Dodd (1976) method, cabinet duration is designated as 
'Average cabinet life I' in Lijphart (1999: 132-3), who observes mean durations ranging from 
1.3 years to 31 years. A cabinet is considered to last as long as its partisan composition 
does not change. A more stringent measure ('Average cabinet life II' in Lijphart, 1999: 132-3) 
also considers a cabinet terminated upon an election, a change of prime minister, or a shift 
in  cabinet  type  (oversized,  minimal  winning,  or  minority  coalition).  The  observed  mean 
Cabinet Life II ranges from 1.0 year to 4.8 years at most. Frequency of elections is the 
causes of the severe upper cutoff. As a result, this more restrictive measure is less clearly 
correlated with the effective number of parties.  It does not distinguish between the almost 
single-party Botswana, where the same party has been in power for 40 years, and multi-
party Costa Rica,  where the partisan composition of the cabinet has changed every 4.7 
years, on the average. This is why we focus on Life I, as defined by Dodd (1976). Using Life 
I also frees us from a constant concern of many studies using Life II, namely whether a 
cabinet termination is 'natural' or rather due to previous or imminent elections (see Laver, 
2003: 26, 31). 
 
In turn, the effective number of legislative parties has been connected to the seat share of 
the largest party, which itself is connected to the product of district magnitude and assembly 
size (Taagepera, 2001). The equations are the following (see Appendix for details of the 
model):  
  N=1/s1
3/2  
    s1=1/(MS)
1/8, 
so that 
    N=(MS)
3/16). 
In  the  case  of  multi-seat  districts,  the  model  presumes  a  PR  allocation  rule  rather  than 
plurality (which is rare in stable democracies).  
The present study uses a slightly corrected relationship for N in terms of s1 (see Appendix):  
  N=1/s1
4/3, 
so that 
    N=(MS)
1/6). 
It is also the first to observe that, in conjunction with C=42yrs./N
2, these equations lead to  
    C=42yrs.(s1
8/3) 
and  
    C= 42yrs./(MS)
1/3. 
Once more, this is not a rigidly deterministic prediction but rather means that the actual 
duration has an equal probability of being above or below 42yrs./(MS)
1/3. While the previous 
equations  connect  mean  cabinet  duration  to  other  variables  that  cannot  be  stipulated 6 
 
legislatively, the latter equation connects C to institutional factors. This is what renders it of 
interest for institutional engineering. 
   
While C=42yrs./N
2 is existing knowledge and N=(MS)
1/3 involves only a minor correction, 
connecting  them  is  novel,  even  though  it  may  look  obvious  in  retrospect.  And  only  this 
connection enables us to test the functional relationship between mean cabinet duration and 
factors amenable to institutional engineering. 
We can now test the prediction for mean cabinet duration at three separate levels of the 
presumed causal chain MS --> s1 --> N --> C.  In this presumed chain, the mean cabinet 
duration is directly connected to the effective number of parties. This part -- and only this 
part -- has been tested previously. Cabinet duration is connected to the largest seat share 
only  indirectly,  through  N.  Hence  we  would  expect  s1  to  have  less  success  than  N  in 
predicting C. Cabinet duration is connected even more indirectly to district magnitude and 
assembly size, through N and s1. Hence we would expect the product MS to be even less 
precise  than  s1  in  predicting  C.  But  this  is  the  relationship  that  matters  for  institutional 
engineering. 
 
For  individual  countries,  the  impact  of  MS  might  be  swamped  by  the  impact  of  political 
culture,  path  dependent  developments,  and  institutional  factors  other  than  M  and  S,  all 
specific to the given country. The worldwide median (i.e., the median of a large number of 
countries) can fit the model to the extent that many country-specific factors other than M and 
S may cancel out. Whether it does, is to be found. If this is the case, then we can factor out 
the impact of district magnitude and assembly size when studying the impact of other factors 
on the mean cabinet duration. We would have narrowed down the problem for the study of 
cultural determinants and political processes. 
 
At  what  stages  do  political  mechanisms  and  processes  enter  in  determining  the  mean 
duration of cabinets? Along with many other factors, they enter in settling assembly size and 
electoral rules in the first place. If these rules allocate all the seats within districts of roughly 
equal magnitude, then district magnitude and assembly size set restrictions on the size of 
the largest party and the effective number of parties, and the most probable outcomes can 
be calculated. This is a mechanical consequence of the political acts of choosing assembly 
size and district magnitude. Politics (and other factors) may enter to modify the probabilistic 
outcome. Even if it does not do so for the worldwide average, it may enter for individual 
countries.  
 
The number of parties, in turn, has mechanical consequences for the number of potential 
conflict channels, which affect cabinet duration. However, some political cultures are more 
adept  than  others  at  managing  conflict,  and  this  may  be  connected  to  features  like 
corruption. Thus, compared to the observed world median, some countries have double the 
duration of cabinets and some others have only one-half, at the same number of parties. 
And the number of parties itself, while depending on assembly size and district magnitude, 
may also be modified by political culture.
v 
 
The Main Prediction and Result 
 
Rather than keep the reader in suspense, we'll leave discussion of data and analysis of 
intervening stages to the next section, and we will immediately give the main result. The total 
range of mean cabinet durations for countries observed extends from 1.3 to 40 years -- a 
ratio of 1 to 30. Thus, without any model, one can already say that all countries have a mean 
cabinet duration of 7.2 years, within a factor of 5.5 (which means multiplying or dividing by 
5.5). Introducing the effective number of legislative parties (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989) 
narrows this range down to the point of predicting the mean cabinet duration in a stable 
democracy  within  a  factor  of  2  (rather  than  5.5).  The  more  distant  connection  of  mean 7 
 
duration to the product of average magnitude and number of assembly seats (MS) cannot be 
expected to do any better than this direct connection. 
Hence our prediction is that mean cabinet durations in most but not all countries will be 
within a factor of 2 (i.e., multiplying or dividing by at most 2) of the value given by the model 
C=42yrs./(MS)
1/3. Taking the logarithms turns this nonlinear equation into a linear one. When 
C is in years, the expected zone is 
  log C = log 42 - (1/3)log(MS) ± log 2, 
and the data can be properly subjected to linear regression analysis. Figure 1 expresses this 
expectation visually.
vi Here the mean duration is graphed against the product  MS, both on 
logarithmic scales, so that the predicted zone becomes a zone along a straight line.  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
   
Without knowing anything about the data for  M and S, the theoretical model allows us to 
predict that, for given product MS, average cabinet durations will yield data points that lie in 
the zone shown, corresponding to  42yrs./(MS)
1/3 multiplied or divided by 2 -- if the model 
holds. Figure 1 highlights the fact that this rather narrow zone is a theoretical prediction that 
precedes any look at data. Our experience is that without such highlighting, some readers 
may  mistake  the  theoretical  prediction  for  a  postdiction  based  on  analysis  of  the  data 
themselves.  
This prediction is eminently falsifiable, because it is much more specific than a vague 'If MS 
is up, then C is down' (meaning dC/d(MS)<0). Even when the latter statement fits and a 
satisfactory correlation between  C  and  MS  is found, the data points may turn out to be 
located all above or all below the predicted zone, or the best-fit line may turn out to have a 
slope vastly different from the predicted 1/3 (on the log scale). Conversely, if most of the 
actual points are within the predicted zone, then the prediction holds regardless of a low R-
square. 
We now superimpose data to the blank format of Figure 1. This is done in Figure 2. Out of 
the 25 countries analyzed, 19 (i.e., 76 percent) lie within the predicted zone, while 3 are 
above  and  3  are  below  this  zone.  Linear  regression  of  logarithms  corresponds  to 
C=21.8(MS)
0.233. This line has a shallower slope (0.233) than the predicted 1/3=0.333. What 
matters for testing the prediction is that it crosses the theoretical line at the center of the data 
cloud and, throughout the actual range of MS, stays within the predicted zone. For the best 
fit line, R
2=0.30. It drops to 0.24 for the predicted line.
vii   
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
In the presumed causal chain  MS  --> s1  -->  N  -->  C,  the  mean  cabinet  duration  is  far 
removed from the product MS.  Yet we still have 76 percent of the data points within a factor 
of 2 from the predicted value. To expect more precise agreement would require blind faith in 
institutional  design,  excluding  any  other  cultural  and  political  inputs.  Recall  that,  in  the 
absence of the model, we could only expect the mean durations to be within a factor of 5.5 
from the overall median of 7.2 years. We have narrowed it down to within a factor of 2, for 
most countries. Thus, the model represents a marked advance in precision of prediction.  
   
It  is  now  time  to  discuss  data  selection  and,  most  important,  examine  the  intermediary 
stages in the causal chain. This enables us to locate the links which most contribute to 
scatter and deviation from the theoretical model. 
 
Detailed Testing of the Model 
 
Lijphart (1999: 76-77 and 132-133) tabulates the mean values of the effective number of 
legislative parties and cabinet duration for all 36 countries that by 1996 had been democratic 
for more than 20 years. We accepted his values of average N, which refer to the period of 
1945-96 or a shorter period in the case of more recent democracies. We used the same data 
that went into Cabinet Life I in Lijphart (1999) and were graciously supplied by Lijphart. We 
introduced, however, an adjustment that leads to slightly longer mean durations.
viii These 
relatively minor differences are readily visible when comparing C in our Table 1 and Cabinet 8 
 
Life I  in  Lijphart (1999:  132-133).  We excluded  Switzerland,  which  stands more than  2 
standard deviations apart from the other countries.
ix This leaves us with 35 countries.
x 
For these 35 countries, we obtained the seat shares of the largest party in any given 
election, mainly from Mackie and Rose (1991 and 1997), Nohlen (1993) and Nohlen et al. 
(2001).
xi From this, w e calculated the mean largest share. We further determined the 
arithmetic mean S and M in those 25 cases where all seats are allocated in districts and 
legal threshold is 1 percent at most.
xii In the other 10 countries seat allocation either 
continues on a supra-district level or is restricted by a legal threshold larger than 1 percent, 
so that a meaningful effective district magnitude is hard to define.
xiii 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Table 1 first lists the 35 countries and the time periods used, and the seat allocatio n rule 
used.  For the 25 countries with definable district magnitude, it further lists the mean district 
magnitudes and assembly sizes during these periods, and the products MS. These countries 
are listed in the order of increasing values of  MS (which should correspond to decreasing 
mean cabinet duration, according to the model). Next, the largest seat shares, the effective 
numbers of legislative parties, the mean inter -elections periods and the mean cabinet 
durations are shown for all 35 countries. Here the 10 countries with undefined M are listed in 
the order of decreasing  s1 (which should correspond to decreasing mean cabinet duration, 
according to the model).
xiv  
   
It follows from the model  C=k/N
2 that k=CN
2. The value of the constant, k=42 years, was 
determined empirically by feeding into this form the actual values of C and N in Table 1.
xv 
Once we proceed beyond  N, to the largest seat share and the product  MS, k=42 years is 
already part of the predictive model, because it is not affected by the actual values of s1 and 
MS. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2 repeats the actual values of mean cabinet duration (C) and also shows the values 
predicted on the basis of the various stages of the model, C1=42yrs./N
2, C2=42yrs.(s1)
8/3 and 
(when possible) C3=42yrs./(MS)
1/3. The ratios of these predicted values to the actual are also 
shown:  C/C1=CN
2/42yrs.,  C/C2=C/[42yrs.s1
8/3],  and  C/C3=C(MS)
1/3/42  yrs.  These  ratios 
should be close to 1, if the models hold. 
Consider  first  the  predictions  based  on  the  effective  number  of  legislative  parties, 
C1=42yrs./N
2. The overall median ratio C/C1 (0.97) is close to 1.00 by definition, given the 
way  k=42  years  was  chosen.
xvi  For  individual  countries,  the  ratio  ranges  from  0.37 
(Mauritius) to 1.72 (Botswana). The median ratio is slightly  lower  (0.94) for the 14 SSD 
systems, exactly 1.00 for the 11 PR systems with well -defined district magnitude, and very 
slightly higher (1.01) for the 10 systems with indefinable  M. The ratios  C/C1 indicate that 
C1=42yrs./N
2 predicts the mean cabinet duration in individual countries essentially within a 
factor of 2.  
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 3 shows the mean duration graphed against the mean effective number of parties, 
both on logarithmic scales. It highlights the exceptional case of Mauritius, the only country 
that deviates by more than a factor of 2. Linear regression of logarithms corresponds to 
C=31.3yrs./N
1.757,  with  R
2=0.79.   The  theoretically  predicted  C1=42yrs./N
2  has  R
2=0.77  -- 
only slightly less than the best fit. The two lines are extremely close to each other throughout 
the range of occurrence of effective numbers of parties and cross at the center of the data 
cloud. This part -- and only his part -- of our study re-checks existing work. What follows is 
new.  
 
Next,  consider  the  predictions  based  on  the  largest  seat  share,  C2=42yrs.(s1)
8/3.  As 
expected, the results are more scattered. For individual countries, the ratio C/C2 ranges from 
0.18 (Mauritius) to 2.04 (Botswana). The overall median ratio is 0.72, i.e., 28 percent below 
the expected 1.00. The median ratio is lowest for the SSD systems (0.65), higher for the PR 9 
 
systems  with  well-defined  magnitude  (0.78),  and  highest  (0.93)  for  the  systems  with 
indefinable  M.  The  ratios  C/C2  show  that  C2=42yrs.(s1)
8/3  still  predicts  the  mean  cabinet 
duration in 28 out of the 35 individual countries (i.e., 80 percent) within a factor of 2. 
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 4 shows mean duration graphed against the mean seat share of the largest party, 
both on logarithmic scales. Only 1 country lies above the predicted zone, while as many as 6 
are below. Linear regression of logarithms corresponds to C=21.9yrs.(s1) 
2.14, with R
2=0.53. 
The theoretically predicted C2=42yrs.(s1)
8/3 has an appreciably lower R
2=0.35. Still, the best-
fit line is contained within the predicted zone throughout the actual range of s1.  
Finally,  consider  the  predictions  based  on  the combination  of  assembly  size  and  district 
magnitude,  C3=42yrs./(MS)
1/3.    In  contrast  to  the  previous  two  predictions,  this  one  is  a 
purely institutional prediction.
xvii We are reduced to 25 cases, because in 10 countries district 
magnitude cannot be defined. We are now several logical steps removed from the effective 
number of parties and can expect appreciable scatter. Indeed, for individual countries, the 
ratio C/C3 ranges from 0.19 (Papua-NG) to 2.84 (Spain). The overall median ratio is 1.08, 
i.e., only 8 percent above the expected 1.00. The median ratio for the SSD systems (0.81) is 
below the expectation, while it is higher (1.08) for the PR systems with well-defined district 
magnitudes. The ratios C/C3 show that C3=42yrs./(MS)
0.333 still predicts the mean cabinet 
duration within a factor of 2 in 19 out of the 25 countries. The corresponding graph has 
already been given (Figure 2) and discussed earlier. 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
It remains to compare the degrees of agreement with the model at the three stages of the 
presumed  causal  chain  MS  -->  s1  -->  N  -->  C.  Table  3  shows  some  comparisons.  As 
expected,  the  degree  of  agreement  decreases  at  each  stage.  Each  stage  compounds 
random scatter and hence reduces correlation with the best-fit line (on logarithmic scale). 
The shift from N to s1 increases the scatter more than the shift from s1 to MS. This contrast is 
even  more  marked  for  the  theoretically  predicted  line,  where  correlation  decreases  at  a 
steeper rate.  
 
The percentage of points within a factor of 2 of the prediction also decreases steeply as we 
shift from N to s1 and only mildly as we shift from s1 to MS. The absolute value of the slope 
of the best-fit line falls short of the expected, and it does so increasingly at each further 
stage.  This  is  the  pattern  expected  when  each  stage  involves  further  accumulation  of 
random scatter.  
 
Figure 5 shows the frequency distributions of the ratios C/C1=CN
2/42, C/C2=C/42s1
8/3, and 
C/C3=C(MS)
1/3/42, using logarithmic intervals. As one successively uses effective number of 
parties, the largest seat share, and the product MS as predictors of mean cabinet duration, 
the distributions widen, as expected. According to the model, the distributions should be 
centered at 1.00. This is largely the case for C/C1 and C/C3. Surprisingly, a shift occurs for 
the intermediary stage C/C2 -- here cabinet durations tend to fall short of the expected. Even 
here, log(C/C2) has a mean of -0.12 (instead of the expected 0), which is small compared to 
the standard deviation (0.23). Once this mean shifts away from 1.00, one would expect the 
mean of log(C/C3) to maintain this shift. It is puzzling (though pleasant!) that the mean C/C3 
actually returns to 1.00. 
 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
How robust are these results against omission of some countries? The median values of the 
ratios C/C1, C/C2, and C/C3 are little affected by the removal of any single country. Suppose 
an extreme case, such as Botswana, is removed. The proportion of the countries within a 
factor of 2 of the expectation would actually increase slightly. The best fit lines in Figures 2 to 10 
 
4 would be tilted away from the predicted lines, but they would still be largely located within 
the predicted zone.   
 
The Impact of Other Factors 
 
From  the  viewpoint  of  the  predictive  models  tested,  the  deviations  from  expectation  are 
random noise. From a broader viewpoint, such deviations include the impact of various other 
institutional, political and cultural factors. The ratios C/C1 etc. in Table 2 represent residuals 
unexplained by the expected effects of N, s1 and MS, respectively. It is now time to consider 
briefly the possible factors that might explain part of these residuals.  
The mean inter-elections period (shown in Table 1) is another institutional factor that might 
interact with mean cabinet duration in both causal directions. More frequent elections offer 
more  opportunities  for  cabinet  reorganization.  Conversely,  cabinet  collapse  sometimes 
triggers early elections. Either way, once the mean cabinet duration is controlled for the 
impact of N, s1 or MS, the residuals (C/C1, C/C2, C/C3) could be expected to have some 
correlation  with  the  mean  inter-elections  period,  which  ranges  from  2.0  to  7.0  years. 
However, no relationship is found (R
2<.03 with all residuals).  
 
Indications  are  that  cultural  factors  such  as  Perceived  Corruption  Index  (Transparency 
International  2004)  could  explain  an  appreciable  part  of  the  residuals.  Inglehart's  (1997) 
survival/self-expression scores and GDP per capita are also candidates. Such variables may 
affect the mean cabinet duration directly or indirectly, by influencing the largest seat share or 
the effective number of parties. Thus the entrance points of such factors need to be clarified. 
This  tasks  remains  to  be  completed.  Such  a  project,  however,  could  not  be  carried  out 
without making use of the present results, because otherwise the cultural inputs would be 
submerged  among  the  institutional.  By  showing  not  only  how  but  also  why  institutional 
factors have a specific impact on the mean cabinet duration, the present study sorts out a 
major institutional impact and makes the study of other factors easier to tackle. The choice of 
appropriate indicators would be greatly helped, if we could develop a logical model of how 
cultural factors may influence cabinet duration. 
 
Implications for Institutional Engineering 
 
For the purposes of institutional engineering, the model predicts that doubling the district 
magnitude would reduce the mean cabinet duration by about 20 percent, if all other factors 
remain the same. Indeed, if we replace M in C=k/(MS)
1/3 by 2M, the ratio of the new duration 
to the previous one is 1/2
1/3=0.79, meaning a reduction by 21 percent. Note that this result is 
independent  of the time  constant k. Its value  in a particular country may differ from the 
worldwide average, due to political culture, but as long as it can be presumed to remain 
constant in the given country, it does not affect the outcome. Only for new democracies 
would we have to depend on the worldwide average value of k=42 years, with obviously 
widened range of error. 
 
Now  consider  a  more  drastic  change.  Suppose  a  country  changes  its  mean  district 
magnitude or assembly size or both, so that the product MS increases more than 100-fold. 
This was the case in 1996 for New Zealand. It shifted from single-seat districts (M=1) and a 
mean assembly size (1946-96) of 85 to nationwide PR for 120 seats. How much change in 
cabinet duration could it expect? The change in MS was from 1x85=85 to 120x120=14,400. 
The  ratio  is  14,400/85=169,  and  (169)
1/3=  5.5.  Thus,  if  no  legal  threshold  had  been 
introduced, the mean duration of cabinets could be expected to fall from previous 6.3 years 
to 6.3/5.5=1.1 years.  
 
However,  New  Zealand  did  introduce  a  5  percent  legal  threshold.  According  to  the 
approximate conversion formula T=75%/(M+1) reported in Lijphart (1999: 153), this would 
correspond to an effective magnitude of 14 rather than 120. If so, then the change in cabinet 11 
 
duration would be (120x14/85)
1/3=2.7, leading to an expected mean duration of 6.3/2.7=2.3 
years under the new setup.  
 
The  actual  mean  duration  of  cabinets  between  1996  and  2002  decreased  even  more 
drastically, from 6.3 years to 1.4 years -- a striking example of institutional impact. However, 
future cabinets may well last somewhat longer, once voters and politicians learn to handle 
the altered institutional framework. Thus, a mean duration of about 2.3 years remains our 
prediction for New Zealand in the long run, provided that the post-1996 electoral system 
survives.  It  would  take  at  least  20  years  past  1996  to  establish  a  meaningful  empirical 
average and check the prediction. We shall see. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The study of cabinet durations involves two aspects: the central tendency for a country with 
stable  institutions,  and  the  dispersion  of  individual  cabinet  durations  around  this  central 
tendency. Both are important but require different approaches. The present study focuses on 
the first issue: the mean durations (as operationalized by Dodd 1976) over a long time span. 
It extends our knowledge in four respects.    
   
First, at the level of theory, it joins two existing models so as to connect the mean cabinet 
duration,  for  the  first  time,  to  two  purely  institutional  features  --  district  magnitude  and 
assembly size. Second, at the empirical level, this quantitatively predictive model is tested 
and  found  to  predict  the  mean  duration  mostly  within  a  factor  of  2.  Once  political 
circumstances and processes have determined assembly size and district magnitude, the 
journey  toward  the  mean  cabinet  duration  is  pretty  much  set  on  autopilot.  Third,  by 
controlling for two major factors, this study supplies an improved starting point for analyzing 
the impact of other political and cultural factors on the mean cabinet duration.  Fourth, it 
contributes  to  institutional  engineering  by  making  it  possible  to  estimate  to  what  degree 
institutional changes might alter the mean duration of cabinets -- not merely the direction of 
such impact. 
 
It may be asked how this model compares with other models for mean cabinet duration. To 
our best knowledge, no other model has been offered. Yes, there are models for variation of 
individual  cabinet  lengths  within  a  country.  There  are  directionally  predictive  models  of 
effects of various variables x on the mean cabinet durations, i.e., for whether dC/dx should 
be positive or negative.  But we are not aware of any other functional models, C=f(x), that 
would quantitatively predict the value of C for given x. 
 
Within the framework of the quantitatively predictive model C=k/(MS)
1/3, we have also tested 
the predictions for an intermediary stage -- the seat share of the largest party. We also have 
retested  the  connection  of  mean  duration  to  the  effective  number  of  party,  leading  to  a 
revised value of the average time constant involved, from k=33 years to k=42 years. 
For three-quarters of the stable democracies tested, the two institutional factors enable us to 
predict the mean duration of cabinets within a factor of two. The next stage would be to 
analyze the residuals, meaning the discrepancies between institutional model and actual 
mean durations, from a cultural-political viewpoint. Corruption, in particular, might account 
for some of these residuals. With such impacts added, the prediction of average cabinet 
durations in stable democracies is highly likely to improve. 
 
 
APPENDIX. Derivation of C= k/(MS)
1/3 
 
This derivation joins the ones in Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and Taagepera (2001), but 
both  parts  are  presented  in  a  more  streamlined  way,  and  a  significant  correction  is 
introduced. 12 
 
 
Consider the number of parties (p') that could win seats in a district of magnitude M. As a 
minimum, 1 party could win all the seats. As a maximum, M parties could win one seat each. 
The actual number could be anything from 1 to M, if nothing else is known but M.  Our 
ignorance may seem complete. Yet we do know something very important, namely the lower 
and higher limits of what is possible: the number of seat-winning parties cannot be smaller 
than 1 nor larger than M. If nothing else is known, the best guess for median p' is the one 
that equalizes the possible error upwards and downwards. This means that the factor by 
which the upper limit exceeds p' should equal the factor by which p' exceeds the lower limit: 
M/p'=p'/1. Hence p'=M
1/2, the geometric mean of the limits.  
   
As an alternative approach, consider the number of seats per party (m'). This number, too, 
could range from 1 (when M parties win 1 seat each) to M (when one party wins all the 
seats). The previous reasoning leads to expect m'=M
1/2. Multiplying the expected number of 
parties by the expected number of seats per party yields p'm'=M, as it should. Thus the two 
approaches are congruent.   
   
Such congruence is not to be taken for granted. Suppose someone argued that the likeliest 
number of parties is the arithmetic mean of 1 and M: p'=(M+1)/2. By the same reasoning, the 
likeliest  number  of  seats  per  party  would  be  m'=(M+1)/2.  But  then  p'm'=(M+1)
2/4,  which 
exceeds M whenever M>1.  
   
As  an  illustrative  example,  the  Netherlands  1918-1952  had  9  elections  with  the  entire 
country as one district of M=100. The model predicts that 100
1/2=10 parties would win seats. 
The actual range of the number of seat-winning parties was 8 to 17, with a geometric mean 
of 10.4, arithmetic mean 10.8, and median 10. In contrast, if arithmetic mean of the extremes 
were used, it would yield p'=50.5 parties and m'=50.5 seats per party, which would lead to 
p'm'=638  seats,  way  above  the  actual  100.  Thus,  the  arithmetic  mean  would  lead  to 
conflicting results. 
   
Next, consider the number parties (p) that could win seats in an assembly of S members 
elected in districts of magnitude M. Our best guess at the number of seat-winning parties in 
each district was p'=M
1/2. Nationwide, it is a likely lower limit, because different parties may 
win seats in different districts. Hence the expectation is p>p'=M
1/2. If the entire country were 
made a single district of magnitude S, we would expect p=S
1/2. This would be a likely higher 
limit on p. Over many occurrences in such a country, the outcomes are likely to spread out 
mainly between these values (although the absolute limits are 1 and S). If nothing else is 
known besides M and S, the best guess for median p is the one that equalizes the possible 
upward and downward errors between M
1/2 and S
1/2. Hence p=(M
1/2S
1/2)
1/2=(MS)
1/4 would be 
expected.  
As an illustrative example, Malta 1947-55 had 5 elections with S=40 and M=5 in all districts. 
The model predicts that (5x40)
1/4=3.76 parties would win seats. The actual range of the 
number of seat-winning parties, nationwide, was 2 to 6, with a geometric mean of 3.73, 
arithmetic mean 4.0 and median 4.  
   
Now consider the number of seats (S1) going to the largest among these p=(MS)
1/4 parties. If 
all parties have equal shares, S1=S/p.  If all other parties have only one seat each, then 
S1=S-p+1. This can be approximated as S1=S when S is sufficiently high. If nothing else is 
known, the best guess for median S1 is the one that equalizes the possible upward and 
downward errors between the limits S/p
 and S. Hence S1=S/p
1/2 is the best guess.
xviii The 
fractional seat share (s1) of the largest party is s1=S1/S=1/p
1/2. Since p=(MS)
1/4, the median 
largest share is s1=(MS)
-1/8.  
   
Taagepera (2001) saw effective number of parties, N=1/si
2 as subject to the following limits. 
When all seat-winning parties have equal shares, N=1/s1. When all other parties are infinite 13 
 
in number and infinitesimally small, then N-->1/s1
2. In the absence of any other information 
but s1, the best guess is the one that equalizes the possible upward and downward errors 
between these limits: N=1/s1
1.5=(MS)
3/16. 
   
However, this estimate involves a mistake. The parties cannot be infinite in number, because 
the number of seat-winning parties at given largest seat share is limited by s1=1/p
1/2 (as 
established above) to p=1/s1
2 parties. The resulting calculations are complex and will be 
published separately. A simple approximation to the complex result replaces 3/16=0.1785 by 
1/6=0.1667 in the estimate above. Hence the new formula is N=(MS)
1/6. 
   
Finally, the mean duration of cabinets (C) is affected by frequency of conflicts. As a first 
approximation, we assume that this frequency is constant when the number and size of 
parties remains the same. This is in line with the constant hazard rate assumption made by 
King et al. (1990) and confirmed by Diermeier and Stevenson (1999).  As the frequency (f) of 
conflicts doubles, cabinet duration is likely to be halved. Thus C=k'/f, where k' is a constant. 
The frequency of conflicts may be assumed to be proportional to the number of potential 
conflict channels (c) within the system: f=k"c, where k" is a constant. With n equal-sized 
parties, the number of such channels among them would be c=n(n-1)/2. When an intra-party 
conflict channel per party is added, the number would be c=n(n+1)/2. The mean of these two 
estimates is c=n
2/2. For parties of varying sizes, the effective number of parties will be used: 
c=N
2/2. Combining these links results in C=k/N
2, where k is a constant, k=2k'/k". The model 
predicts an inverse square relationship, leaving k to be determined empirically. Combining 
C=k/N
2 with N=(MS)
1/6 yields C=k/(MS)
1/3. Like C itself, k has the units of time. Empirically, 
k=42 years, so that C=42yrs./(MS)
1/3. 
   14 
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Figure 1. Theoretical prediction of the effect of product MS on mean cabinet duration 
(C). 
 
Notes: 
Solid line: C=42 years/(MS)
1/3 
Dashed lines: one-half and double the expected value. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Product MS and mean cabinet duration C: regression between logarithms 
and theoretical prediction. 
 
Notes: 
Thin straight line: best fit between logarithms. 
Bold straight line: theoretically based prediction [C=42 years/(MS)
1/3]. 
Dashed lines: one-half and double the expected value. 
1
10
100
10 100 1000 10000 100000
MS
C
 
(
y
e
a
r
s
)
C = 42/(MS)
1/3
NED
SPA
IND
PNG
MRT
BOT
C = 21.848/(MS)
0.233
(R
2 = 0.300)
1
10
100
10 100 1000 10000 100000
MS
C
 
(
y
e
a
r
s
)
C = 42/(MS)
1/3
(R
2 = 0.240)17 
 
Figure 3. Effective number of parties (N) and mean cabinet duration (C): regression 
between logarithms and theoretical prediction. 
 
Notes: 
Thin solid line: best fit between logarithms. 
Bold solid line: theoretically based prediction [C=42 years/N
2]. 
Dashed lines: one-half and double the expected value. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Largest party's seat share (s1) and mean cabinet duration (C): regression 
between logarithms and theoretical prediction. 
 
Notes: 
Thin straight line: best fit between logarithms. 
Bold straight line: theoretically based prediction [C=42 years(s1
8/3)]. 
Dashed lines: one-half and double the expected value. 
 
ITA
JAP
IND
PNG
MRT
JAM
BOT
C = 21.9s1
2.14
(R
2 = 0.528)
1
10
100
0.1 1
s1
C
 
(
y
e
a
r
s
)
C = 42s1
8/3
(R
2 = 0.348)18 
 
Figure 5. Frequency distributions of the ratios of actual cabinet duration (C) to values 
predicted by effective number of parties (C1=42/N
2), largest seat share (C2=42s1
8/3), and 
the product of district magnitude and assembly size (C3=42/(MS)
1/3), respectively. 
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Table 1. Seat allocation rule, mean district magnitude (M), assembly size (S), product 
MS, largest  seat  share  (s1),  effective  number  of  legislative  parties  (N), mean  inter-
elections period (I), and mean cabinet duration (C). 
 
  Rule
a  M
  S  MS
b  s1  N  I 
(years) 
C 
(years) 
Barbados 1966-94   P  1  26  26  0.7  1.76  4.7  9.50 
Trinidad 1961-2001  P  1  36  36  0.746  1.82  4.9  10.00 
Botswana 1965-2004  P  1  37  37  0.749  1.35  5.2  39.60+ 
Bahamas 1972-2002  P  1  42  42  0.732  1.68  5.0  14.90 
Jamaica 1962-89   P  1  55  55  0.755  1.62  4.6  9.20 
Mauritius 1976-97  P  1  68  68  0.624  2.71  3.8  2.10 
New Zealand 1946-96  P  1  85  85  0.569  1.96  2.9  6.30 
Papua-NG 1977-97  P  1  108  108  0.397  5.98  5.7  1.65 
Australia 1946-96   STV  1  128  128  0.507  2.22  2.4  9.90 
Canada 1945-93   P  1  270  270  0.555  2.37  3.2  8.00 
United States 1947-2001  P  1  435
  435  0.619  2.4  2.0  7.70 
France 1959-2002  TR
c  1  508  508  0.444  3.43  3.8  3.10 
India 1977-96   P  1  542  542  0.55  4.11  3.8  2.40 
United Kingdom 1945-97   P  1  635  635  0.534  2.11  3.1  8.60 
Median for 14 M=1 systems  8.30 
                 
Malta 1966-87   STV  5  59  294  0.529  1.99  5.3  10.60 
Costa Rica 1953-98  L  7.8  55  426  0.524  2.41  4.1  4.90 
Ireland 1948-97  STV  3.5  154  538  0.482  2.84  3.1  3.80 
Luxembourg 1945-99  L  14.2  57
d  809  0.411  3.36  7.0  6.00 
Norway 1945-97  L  7.7  154  1190  0.466  3.35  3.8  4.30 
Japan 1946-96   SNTV  4  486  1940  0.54  3.71  2.5  3.90 
Spain 1977-2004  L  6.7  350  2330  0.501  2.76  3.1  9.00 
Portugal 1976-2002  L  11.3  249  2810  0.43  3.33  2.4  3.20 
Finland 1945-2003  L  14  200  2940  0.268  5.03  3.6  1.50 
Israel 1949-96   L  120  120  14400  0.379  4.55  3.6  1.75 
Netherlands 1946-2002  L  140  140
e  20000  0.344  4.65  3.4  3.30 
Median for 11 M>1 systems  3.90 
                 
Greece 1974-2004          0.556  2.2  2.7  4.90 
Colombia 1958-96
f           0.526  3.32  2.9  4.70 
Venezuela 1959-99          0.461  3.38  5.0  3.10 
Austria 1945-2000          0.494  2.48  3.2  9.00 
Sweden 1948-94           0.465  3.33  3.1  5.10 
Italy 1946-94          0.412  4.91  4.2  1.33 
Germany 1949-98          0.418
g  2.93  3.7  3.80 
Denmark 1945-2001          0.368  4.51  2.4  2.80 
Iceland 1946-95           0.343  3.72  3.3  2.90 
Belgium 1946-2003          0.342  4.32  3.1  2.40 
Median for 10 systems with M undefined  3.45 
 
(Continued)20 
 
(Table 1, continued) 
 
a:  Seat  allocation  rules:  P  =  plurality;  STV  =  single  transferable  vote;  TR  =  two  rounds 
majority; L = list PR; SNTV = single non-transferable vote. 
b: When M and/or S vary, mean MS may slightly differ from (mean M)(mean S) and  
mean [s1(MS)
1/8]
 may slightly differ from (mean s1)(mean MS)
1/8. 
c: France: List PR in 1986. 
d: Luxembourg: S ranges from 25 (partial elections) to 64. 
e: Netherlands: S=100 in 1946-52; S=150 in 1956-94. 
f: Columbia: including 2 elections boycotted by PL, resulting in s1=1.00. 
g: Germany: CSU not included in CDU. 21 
 
Table 2. Predicted values of mean cabinet duration (C), based on effective number of 
legislative parties (N), on largest party seat share (s1), and on the product of district 
magnitude (M) and assembly size (S). Here, ‘42’ is abbreviated notation for ‘42 years’.   
 
Actual 
C 
 (years) 
C1=42/N
2  C/C1  C2=42s1
8/
3  C/C2 
C3= 
   42   
  
(MS)
1/
3 
C/C
3 
Barbados  9.5  13.56  0.70  16.22  0.59  14.18  0.67 
Trinidad  10  12.68  0.79  19.23  0.52  12.72  0.79 
Botswana  39.6+  23.05  1.72
+  19.43 
2.04
+  12.60  3.14 
Bahamas  14.9  14.88  1.00  18.28  0.82  12.08  1.23 
Jamaica  9.2  16.00  0.57  19.85  0.46  11.04  0.83 
Mauritius  2.1  5.72  0.37  11.94  0.18  10.29  0.20 
New Zealand  6.3  10.93  0.58  9.34  0.67  9.55  0.66 
Papua-NG  1.65  1.17  1.40  3.58  0.46  8.82  0.19 
Australia  9.9  8.52  1.16  6.86  1.44  8.33  1.19 
Canada  8  7.48  1.07  8.74  0.92  6.50  1.23 
United States  7.7  7.29  1.06  11.69  0.66  5.54  1.39 
France  3.1  3.57  0.87  4.82  0.64  5.26  0.59 
India  2.4  2.49  0.97  8.53  0.28  5.15  0.47 
United Kingdom  8.6  9.43  0.91  7.88  1.09  4.89  1.76 
Median  for  14  M=1 
systems  8.3  8.98  0.94  10.51  0.65  9.19  0.81 
               
Malta  10.6  10.61  1.00  7.69  1.38  6.32  1.68 
Costa Rica  4.9  7.23  0.68  7.50  0.65  5.58  0.88 
Ireland  3.8  5.21  0.73  6.00  0.63  5.16  0.74 
Luxembourg  6  3.72  1.61  3.92  1.53  4.51  1.33 
Norway  4.3  3.74  1.15  5.48  0.78  3.96  1.08 
Japan  3.9  3.05  1.28  8.12  0.48  3.37  1.16 
Spain  9  5.51  1.63  6.65  1.35  3.17  2.84 
Portugal  3.2  3.79  0.84  4.42  0.72  2.98  1.08 
Finland  1.5  1.66  0.90  1.25  1.20  2.93  0.51 
Israel  1.75  2.03  0.86  3.16  0.55  1.73  1.01 
Netherlands  3.3  1.94  1.70  2.44  1.35  1.55  2.13 
Median  for  11  M>1 
systems  3.9  3.74  1.00  5.48  0.78  3.37  1.08 
               
Greece  4.9  8.68  0.56  8.78  0.56     
Colombia  4.7  3.81  1.23  7.57  0.62     
Venezuela  3.1  3.68  0.84  5.33  0.58     
Austria  9  6.83  1.32  6.41  1.41     
Sweden  5.1  3.79  1.35  5.45  0.94     
Italy  1.33  1.74  0.76  3.95  0.34     
Germany  3.8  4.89  0.78  4.10  0.93     
Denmark  2.8  2.06  1.36  2.92  0.96     
Iceland  2.9  3.04  0.96  2.42  1.20     
Belgium  2.4  2.25  1.07  2.40  1.00     
Median for 10 systems  
with M undefined  3.45  3.73  1.01  4.71  0.93     
               
Overall medians  4.70  4.89  0.97  6.65  0.72  5.54  1.08 22 
 
Table 3.  Degrees of agreement with the model, at various stages of the causal chain  
MS --> s1 --> N --> C. 
 
Stage   N --> C  s1 --> C  MS  --> C 
       
R
2 for best-fit line  0.79  0.53  0.30 
R
2 for predicted line  0.77  0.35  0.24 
Difference  0.02  0.18  0.06 
       
Percentage of points within       
a factor of 2 of the prediction  97 %  80 %  76 % 
       
Expected slope   -2.00  +2.67  -0.333 
Best-fit slope 
Difference 
-1.76 
12 % 
+2.14 
20 % 
-0.233 
30 % 
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          Notes 
 
                                                           
 
i Laver and Shepsle (1996) is a prominent example of the public choice approach to cabinet 
duration. The chapter on 'Party systems and cabinet stability' (1996:195-222) offers theory, 
simulations, and discussion of specific past cases. The 'two basic conclusions' are that 
certain bargaining constellations are 'substantially more stable' than certain others, and that 
'the model can be used to understand why governments might change tack between 
elections' (Laver and Shepsle, 1996: 215). Illuminating arguments are made, but no 
quantitative predictions are offered about how much duration could be expected, under 
some specified conditions, with a 50-50 probability. 
 
ii Causality may go in both directions. The number of parties at the time the electoral rules 
are chosen influences the choice (cf. Colomer, 2005). Later on, electoral rules affect the 
number of parties. 
 
iii The size of assembly, in turn, depends heavily on the size of population represented. A 
direct impact of population on the number of parties, bypassing assembly size, is 
conceivable but remains to be demonstrated. 
 
iv Surprisingly, we have encountered opinions that C=k/N
2 is not a truly theoretical equation, 
because the constant k is not theoretically defined but is induced from observations. In 
contrast, Sørensen (1998) and Hedström (2004) consider establishing such constants an 
important part of testing the predictive model. Indeed, if it were not so, then even the law of 
gravitation, F=GMm/r
2, would not qualify as a theoretical equation, given that the numerical 
value of the universal constant of gravitation (G) is not theoretically derived. Like k in the 
Taagepera and Shugart (1989) model, G is induced from observation. Both have a metric; in 
particular, k comes in units of time -- years or months. What makes F=GMm/r
2 and C=k/N
2 
theoretical is that the functional form is logically deduced. 
 
v The impact of cultural and political factors at various stages may well be interconnected. 
For example, polities adept at managing conflict even at a large number of parties may also 
be more likely to choose large district magnitudes in the first place, because both are 
aspects of a consensual political philosophy (Lijphart 1999). The model presented expresses 
the mechanical consequences of some institutional decisions. It does not address the 
various other potential causal links.  
 
vi Why focus on factor of 2, rather than 1.5, 3 or e=2.73? It's a simple way to make the 
degrees of deviation from the model visible. Since the deviations from C=42yrs./N
2 fit within 
this range, but barely, the wider deviations from C=42yrs.(s1
8/3) and C= 42yrs./(MS)
1/3 will be 
readily visible in this format. On the logarithmic graph, the zone within a factor of 2 appears 
as the narrows zone at ±log2=±0.3 from the expected value. 
 
vii Fitting to M and S separately could increase the fit, since we could juggle two exponents 
separately, as compared to a single exponent for the product MS. But this would be curve 
fitting without any theoretical basis. No theoretical model for the impact of M and S 
separately seems to exist. 
 
viii The values in Lijphart (1999) are calculated as if all cabinets collapsed at the cutoff point 
of data collection (30 June 1996). Thus Netanyahu, who became prime minister of Israel on 
29 May 1996, contributes a cabinet lasting only 33 days, much short of its actual duration. 
This procedure artificially reduces Israel's mean cabinet duration. In contrast, we used the 24 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
actual durations of cabinets that started prior to 30 June 1996 and collapsed prior to 1 
September 2004 (data from Keesing’s Record of World Events). Hence our means are larger 
than Lijphart's. The gap is the most pronounced for Bahamas, where Lijphart (1999) lists the 
mean of two prime ministerships -- (19.9+3.9)/2=11.9 years -- although the latter continued 
for 6.0 years beyond June 1996. We list (19.9 + 9.9)/2 = 14.9 years. In Botswana the same 
party was in power from the beginning of independence (1965) to 1996 and beyond, winning 
elections again in October 2004. Here we show the duration as 39+ years, although the 
prime minister obviously has changed during this long spell. 
 
ix The inverse square law implies that the product N
2C is conserved. The actual distribution 
of N
2C around the mean of 42 years is roughly normal (cf. later Figure 5), except that 
Switzerland stands more than 2 standard deviations apart from the rest. Such a deviation 
indicates that it is somehow different from all the other countries, justifying its exclusion from 
the set. Switzerland is the only non-presidential country where the executive, once 
empowered by parliament, does not depend on legislative confidence (Lijphart, 1999: 119-
20). Thus a key assumption of the inverse square model does not apply. 
 
x Among the 35 countries, Mauritius is problematic. Jugnauth was prime minister for 13.6 
years (1982-95), which would lead to a mean duration of 9.6 years, except that the party 
composition of his cabinet changed seven times in quite minor ways. Thus Dodd's (1976) 
counting rules force us to slice Jugnauth's tenure into eighttechnically separate cabinets, 
which leads to a mean duration of only 2.1 years for Mauritius. Although 9.2 years seems to 
express better the realities on the ground, we adhere to 2.1 years, because the rules should 
not be changed in the middle of the game. However, the cases of Mauritius and also 
Botswana (see Note 8) suggest that some modification of Dodd's rules might be desirable. 
Maybe we should give partial credit to cabinets with changed party membership but the 
same prime minister, and subtract some credit from same-party cabinets when prime 
ministers change. 
 
xi The start of the time period is the one used by Lijphart (1999). In line with observations in 
Note 8, the end point corresponds to the end of the cabinet that was in power on 30 June 
1996. 
 
xii As convincingly documented by Monroe and Rose (2002), the political impact at the same 
mean magnitude can be significantly different when individual districts have grossly 
divergent magnitudes.  If anything, non-optimal input data would be likely to worsen the fit to 
a predictive model, not improve it. 
 
xiii Is this number of countries sufficient to test the model? More cases would be nice, but 
what we have used is essentially the entire set of post-WWII stable democracies available, if 
we accept Lijphart's (1999) criteria. Since 1999, very few democracies could be added to the 
list, given that those in Central East Europe have lasted as yet less than 20 years.  
 
xiv During the periods considered, the values of all variables listed have varied. Using the 
mean values may blur the relationships and hence worsen the fit of the predictive model, but 
it cannot possibly improve it.  
 
xv The value of k should be such that the average value of the expression C/C1 is 1, meaning 
that average CN
2/k=1. The various measures of central tendencies yield somewhat different 
values of k. The arithmetic mean yields k=41.1, the geometric mean yields k=42.5, and the 
median yields k=43.3 years. We choose the rounded-off k=42 years as a compromise 
among these. 25 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
xvi In the following analysis, we prefer to use the median because it does not prejudge the 
shape of the distribution. Using the arithmetic mean presumes a normal distribution, or at 
least a symmetrical one. Using the geometric mean presumes a lognormal distribution or at 
least a 'log-symmetrical' one (where logarithms are distributed symmetrically). The median is 
neutral in this respect. 
 
xvii No claim of unidirectional causality is involved here. The effective number of parties or the 
seat share of the largest party at the moment of choosing the electoral rules may well affect 
the choice of district magnitude -- cf. Note 2. All we say is that M and S are institutionally 
stipulated, while N and s1 are not.    
 
xviii The overestimate introduced by the approximation S1=S-p+1≈S does not exceed 5 
percent as long as S remains above 100 when M=S and above 10 when M=1. 
 
xviii Laver and Shepsle (1996) is a prominent example of the public choice approach to 
cabinet duration. The chapter on 'Party systems and cabinet stability' (1996:195-222) offers 
theory, simulations, and discussion of specific past cases. The 'two basic conclusions' are 
that certain bargaining constellations are 'substantially more stable' than certain others, and 
that 'the model can be used to understand why governments might change tack between 
elections' (Laver and Shepsle, 1996: 215). Illuminating arguments are made, but no 
quantitative predictions are offered about how much duration could be expected, under 
some specified conditions, with a 50-50 probability. 
 
xviii Causality may go in both directions. The number of parties at the time the electoral rules 
are chosen influences the choice (cf. Colomer, 2005). Later on, electoral rules affect the 
number of parties. 
 
xviii The size of assembly, in turn, depends heavily on the size of population represented. A 
direct impact of population on the number of parties, bypassing assembly size, is 
conceivable but remains to be demonstrated. 
 
xviii Surprisingly, we have encountered opinions that C=k/N
2 is not a truly theoretical equation, 
because the constant k is not theoretically defined but is induced from observations. In 
contrast, Sørensen (1998) and Hedström (2004) consider establishing such constants an 
important part of testing the predictive model. Indeed, if it were not so, then even the law of 
gravitation, F=GMm/r
2, would not qualify as a theoretical equation, given that the numerical 
value of the universal constant of gravitation (G) is not theoretically derived. Like k in the 
Taagepera and Shugart (1989) model, G is induced from observation. Both have a metric; in 
particular, k comes in units of time -- years or months. What makes F=GMm/r
2 and C=k/N
2 
theoretical is that the functional form is logically deduced. 
 
xviii The impact of cultural and political factors at various stages may well be interconnected. 
For example, polities adept at managing conflict even at a large number of parties may also 
be more likely to choose large district magnitudes in the first place, because both are 
aspects of a consensual political philosophy (Lijphart 1999). The model presented expresses 
the mechanical consequences of some institutional decisions. It does not address the 
various other potential causal links.  
 
xviii Why focus on factor of 2, rather than 1.5, 3 or e=2.73? It's a simple way to make the 
degrees of deviation from the model visible. Since the deviations from C=42yrs./N
2 fit within 
this range, but barely, the wider deviations from C=42yrs.(s1
8/3) and C= 42yrs./(MS)
1/3 will be 
readily visible in this format. On the logarithmic graph, the zone within a factor of 2 appears 
as the narrows zone at ±log2=±0.3 from the expected value. 26 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
xviii Fitting to M and S separately could increase the fit, since we could juggle two exponents 
separately, as compared to a single exponent for the product MS. But this would be curve 
fitting without any theoretical basis. No theoretical model for the impact of M and S 
separately seems to exist. 
 
xviii The values in Lijphart (1999) are calculated as if all cabinets collapsed at the cutoff point 
of data collection (30 June 1996). Thus Netanyahu, who became prime minister of Israel on 
29 May 1996, contributes a cabinet lasting only 33 days, much short of its actual duration. 
This procedure artificially reduces Israel's mean cabinet duration. In contrast, we used the 
actual durations of cabinets that started prior to 30 June 1996 and collapsed prior to 1 
September 2004 (data from Keesing’s Record of World Events). Hence our means are larger 
than Lijphart's. The gap is the most pronounced for Bahamas, where Lijphart (1999) lists the 
mean of two prime ministerships -- (19.9+3.9)/2=11.9 years -- although the latter continued 
for 6.0 years beyond June 1996. We list (19.9 + 9.9)/2 = 14.9 years. In Botswana the same 
party was in power from the beginning of independence (1965) to 1996 and beyond, winning 
elections again in October 2004. Here we show the duration as 39+ years, although the 
prime minister obviously has changed during this long spell. 
 
xviii The inverse square law implies that the product N
2C is conserved. The actual distribution 
of N
2C around the mean of 42 years is roughly normal (cf. later Figure 5), except that 
Switzerland stands more than 2 standard deviations apart from the rest. Such a deviation 
indicates that it is somehow different from all the other countries, justifying its exclusion from 
the set. Switzerland is the only non-presidential country where the executive, once 
empowered by parliament, does not depend on legislative confidence (Lijphart, 1999: 119-
20). Thus a key assumption of the inverse square model does not apply. 
 
xviii Among the 35 countries, Mauritius is problematic. Jugnauth was prime minister for 13.6 
years (1982-95), which would lead to a mean duration of 9.6 years, except that the party 
composition of his cabinet changed seven times in quite minor ways. Thus Dodd's (1976) 
counting rules force us to slice Jugnauth's tenure into eighttechnically separate cabinets, 
which leads to a mean duration of only 2.1 years for Mauritius. Although 9.2 years seems to 
express better the realities on the ground, we adhere to 2.1 years, because the rules should 
not be changed in the middle of the game. However, the cases of Mauritius and also 
Botswana (see Note 8) suggest that some modification of Dodd's rules might be desirable. 
Maybe we should give partial credit to cabinets with changed party membership but the 
same prime minister, and subtract some credit from same-party cabinets when prime 
ministers change. 
 
xviii The start of the time period is the one used by Lijphart (1999). In line with observations in 
Note 8, the end point corresponds to the end of the cabinet that was in power on 30 June 
1996. 
 
xviii As convincingly documented by Monroe and Rose (2002), the political impact at the same 
mean magnitude can be significantly different when individual districts have grossly 
divergent magnitudes.  If anything, non-optimal input data would be likely to worsen the fit to 
a predictive model, not improve it. 
 
xviii Is this number of countries sufficient to test the model? More cases would be nice, but 
what we have used is essentially the entire set of post-WWII stable democracies available, if 
we accept Lijphart's (1999) criteria. Since 1999, very few democracies could be added to the 
list, given that those in Central East Europe have lasted as yet less than 20 years.  
 27 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
xviii During the periods considered, the values of all variables listed have varied. Using the 
mean values may blur the relationships and hence worsen the fit of the predictive model, but 
it cannot possibly improve it.  
xviii The value of k should be such that the average value of the expression C/C1 is 1, 
meaning that average CN
2/k=1. The various measures of central tendencies yield somewhat 
different values of k. The arithmetic mean yields k=41.1, the geometric mean yields k=42.5, 
and the median yields k=43.3 years. We choose the rounded-off k=42 years as a 
compromise among these. 
xviii In the following analysis, we prefer to use the median because it does not prejudge the 
shape of the distribution. Using the arithmetic mean presumes a normal distribution, or at 
least a symmetrical one. Using the geometric mean presumes a lognormal distribution or at 
least a 'log-symmetrical' one (where logarithms are distributed symmetrically). The median is 
neutral in this respect. 
xviii No claim of unidirectional causality is involved here. The effective number of parties or 
the seat share of the largest party at the moment of choosing the electoral rules may well 
affect the choice of district magnitude -- cf. Note 2. All we say is that M and S are 
institutionally stipulated, while N and s1 are not.    
xviii The overestimate introduced by the approximation S1=S-p+1≈S does not exceed 5 
percent as long as S remains above 100 when M=S and above 10 when M=1. 
 